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This paper investigates local government consolidations with a focus on public choice 
aspects in the decision-making. Politicians could lose future payoffs if their locality 
merges with a larger counterpart, and they may sabotage the merger process. The analysis 
with data from 3,212 Japanese municipalities reveals that a long-serving mayor would 
present an obstacle to consolidation. 
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  Merger and break-up of political units takes place at two levels. One is 
undertaken by the sovereign nations and the other is assumed by the local governments 
within individual nations. Although the former has drawn substantial interests among 
researchers,
1 the latter is no less significant since it directly affects the welfare of local 
residents. Reorganization of local jurisdictions also represents an event of considerable 
importance for politicians. When municipality boundaries are re-drawn, the local 
political landscape cannot remain intact. If a small village is absorbed by a large 
neighboring city with dominant presence in the region, for instance, it is unlikely that the 
village mayor can successfully contest in the post-merger city mayoral election. 
 
  There is a growing body of literature that tests public choice hypotheses with 
data from local governments. Coelho, Veiga and Veiga (2006) and Veiga and Veiga 
(2007a), for example, identify the political business cycle through information from 
Portuguese municipalities. Foucault, Madies and Paty (2008) find the pre-election 
opportunistic behavior of the French local governments. Veiga and Veiga (2007b) 
observe that the Portuguese mayors are rewarded for their fiscal opportunism in their 
reelection campaign. Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) reached a similar conclusion for 
reelection of Brazilian mayors.  
 
  Past inquiry into the municipality reorganization has, however, mainly focused 
on the efficiency of public goods provision under alternative jurisdictions (Deller and 
Edward, 1992; and Vojnovic, 2000).
2 This paper attempts to fill the gap and takes an 
explicit account of politicians’ incentives in the decision of localities to engage in merger. 
 
  The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the 
hypothesis to be tested in this paper. The third section gives a brief background of the 
local government consolidation in Japan as a case study. The fourth section describes the 
data and empirical analyses and reports regression estimates. The concluding section 
provides suggested areas for further investigation. 
 
 
                                                  
1 Studies into secession, for example, include Wittman (1991) and Bolton and Roland (1997). 
2 An exception is Sørensen (2006), in which political factors are examined as part of determinants 
of consolidation decision of Norwegian municipalities. 
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 II. Mayor Incentives 
 
  The hypothesis to be tested in this research is that a long-serving mayor would be 
reluctant to merge his locality with larger counterparts. There are cases in which 
consolidation partners can be classified into “dominant” and “subordinate” members, 
where dominant localities are likely to be large and fiscally more stable, while the 
subordinate partners could be smaller and in difficult economic situations. Reflecting 
their differences, they may not share the same determinants for their respective 
consolidation choice. Small municipalities facing financial constraints may find it a 
viable option for their survival to seek merger with larger counterparts. It may not, 
however, constitute an attractive option for elected officials in those localities since 
uncertainty arises as to their post-merger positions. 
 
  The incentives to preserve the municipality, hence its incumbent position, grow 
with the length of time the mayor has occupied the post for two reasons. First, the longer 
he serves in the mayor’s capacity, the more effective he becomes to translate his priorities 
into the municipality policy.
3 A multiple of terms not only makes the mayor familiar with 
executive and legislative mechanisms for policy implementation, but also provides him 
with opportunities to promote the municipal government personnel that understand and 
assist his priorities. The power the mayor enjoys as an experienced executive also makes 
it easier to sabotage the merger when he finds it necessary. Second, vested interests for 
mayors themselves as well as for their associates could be generated as mayors are 
repeatedly re-elected. Thus, benefits forgone could become substantial if a long-serving 
mayor allows his municipality to engage in merger in which the locality becomes a minor 
part of a larger authority. 
 
III. Local Government Consolidations in Japan 
 
  There were two waves of municipal mergers in the post-war Japan. The first took 
place in the mid-1950s, when the central government enacted the Law to Promote Town 
and Villages Mergers in 1953. This law was an attempt to reorganize local governments, 
mainly through mergers, so that they could assume greater responsibilities for public 
                                                  
3 Miquel and Snyder (2006) is an inquiry into the relationship between politicians’ legislative 
effectiveness and accumulated tenure. Using data from North Carolina State House of 
Representatives, they find that legislators become more effective as they gain more experience, 




 service provisions in the area of compulsory education, firefighting, and law enforcement. 
The number of local authorities decreased from 9,868 in 1953 to 3,975 by the time the law 
expired in 1956, which amounts to the reduction of 59.7%. 
 
  Four decades later, the central government launched another round of municipal 
mergers in order to strengthen their capacities for autonomous operation. This is in 
anticipation of the greater demand for local welfare services in the face of aging 
population. The central government provided fiscal incentives for voluntary 
consolidation in the form of the Law to Promote Municipal Mergers in 1999, and 
specified that local authorities should engage in merger by March 31, 2006 to qualify for 
the incentives. For example, the central government guaranteed that the amount of the 
transfer to municipalities (Local Allocation Tax) would be maintained at the pre-merger 
level even if a consolidation results in improvement of fiscal conditions (Article 17). This 
constituted a substantial incentive for the local authorities, as the central government 
forecasted that the total fund of the Local Allocation Tax would decline, while the tax 
base in many local economies was shrinking. The government also gave merging 
localities an option to issue special municipal bonds on the condition that it would bear 
70 % of the principal repayments. As is demonstrated in Table 1, the municipalities that 
stood at 3,232 on March 31, 1999 and 3,212 at the end of March 2003 were reduced to 
1,821 by the deadline. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
  
  Of the 3,212 localities of March 2003, 1,940 (290 cities and 1,650 
towns/villages) engaged in 549 sets of consolidations, to reduce their number by 1,391. In 
order to identify those that chose to be a subordinate merger partner, this research uses a 
population criterion. If one of the merging localities dominates the post-consolidation 
municipality with more than half the total population, it is designated as the dominant 
partner. Its presence in turn renders the other partners subordinate. Among 549 
consolidations, 418 had a dominant member (255 cities and 163 towns/villages), which 
made 925 municipalities (17 cities and 908 towns/villages) as a subordinate merger 
member.
4 The towns/villages tend to be less populous and are more likely to be 
subordinate merger partners. 
                                                  
4 It is possible for a consolidation to take place without a dominant entity. This happens, for 
example, when three municipalities with similar population size merge. In our sample, 131 cases 
fall in this “no dominant” category, which makes 597 municipalities engaged in merger neither 




  The following analysis uses all the municipalities that existed as of March 31, 
2003 as the sample and investigates the determinants of their decision whether to be a 
subordinate merger partner. The dependent variable is one for localities that entered 
merger as a subordinate and zero otherwise. As the dependent variable is a discrete 
variable, the analysis employs the probit and logistic specifications. Among the 
explanatory variables are: MAYOR, POP, AREA, and CURRENT. The variable, 
MAYOR, represents mayor’s term in terms of the number of months between installation 
of the incumbent and July 2002. If our hypothesis holds, this variable has a negative 
coefficient. Size variables for the municipality population and acreage in 2002, POP and 
AREA, enter the regression because expanding the size of local authorities was one of the 
principal objectives of the central government’s consolidation initiative. The public 
finance variable, CURRENT, represents the percentage share of municipality’s 
expenditure disbursed for the current operation (such as wages) out of its total current 
revenue for the fiscal year 2002. This variable depicts the effect of financial situations on 
merger decisions: As this share increases, the local government loses flexibility in its 
fiscal management. Summary statistics of the explanatory variables are presented in 
Table 2. 
 
Coefficient estimates are shown in Table 3 for the probit specifications and Table 
4 for the logistic. The first two columns, I and II, are based on the sub-sample of towns 
and villages. Columns III and IV are derived from the full sample including cities. The 
dummy variable for cities (CITY) is in the regressions III and IV. Squared terms of 
MAYOR, POP and CURRENT are also in the regression, as it is of interest to examine if 
quadratic relationship is observed between these variables and the dependent variable. 
The primary finding is that the squared mayor term (MAYOR-SQ) has coefficients that 
are negative and statistically significant in specifications I - III. In the sub-sample 
analysis with towns and villages, exclusion of the linear MAYOR variable (whose 
coefficient is consistently insignificant) does not affect the significance of its quadratic 
variable. As is predicted by the hypothesis, long-serving mayors have lower probabilities 
of becoming subordinate merger members: The probability falls with the length of term. 
The probit coefficients in specification II implies that the likelihood that a municipality 
with average population, land area, and current fiscal balance becomes a subordinate is 
34.98% when its mayor has completed the first 4-year term (MAYOR; 48). The 
probability decreases to 34.43% at the end of the second term, to 33.53% at the third, and 
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 to 32.29% at the end of the fourth term.
5 
 
Coefficient estimates for the two size variables implies that a smaller 
municipality is more likely to become a subordinate partner. Coefficients of POP and 
POP-SQ imply that the likelihood to become a subordinate partner decreases as 
population increases for most of the towns/villages samples. The CURRENT variable has 
statistically significant coefficients for both itself and its squared form. Their combination 
indicates that the propensity for a town/village to be a subordinate merger partner 
increases until its CURRENT value reaches about 91-92 and that it decreases thereafter. 
In view of the variable’s average value of 85.76 (and standard deviations of 7.0) for these 
samples, this shows that, across the financial condition spectrum, the localities that are 
more (by one standard deviation) constrained than the average are more likely to engage 
in merger as a subordinate than others. As they move to both ends of the spectrum, it 
becomes less likely that they become a subordinate merger partner. Financially sound 
authorities do not need consolidation: Municipalities facing severe financial constraints 
cannot find a willing merger partner that agrees to absorb them. 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
  This paper has investigated the determinants of a local government’s 
consolidation decision. One of the findings is that a long-serving mayor could become an 
obstacle when the combination of potential merging localities requires that its 
municipality be a subordinate member. To the extent that mayors can influence the local 
public decision, their self-serving motives may stand in the way of mergers if they judge 
that their own political survival is at stake.
6 This observation constitutes an important 
policy implication: It may be desirable to install a procedure, in the case of mayoral veto 
in the consolidation negotiations, for the referendum among municipality residents to 
reach the final decision on the issue. 
 
  One potential extension of this analysis would involve incorporating the source 
of differences among prefectures, if any, regarding the degree of opportunistic behavior 
                                                  
5 These probabilities are derived from the probit scores calculated by multiplying the coefficients 
by mean values of POP, AREA, CURRENT, while changing MAYOR values from 48, 96, 144, to 
192. 
6 The mayor term is not a factor for a merger decision as a dominant partner. The null hypothesis 
that the coefficient of the mayor term variable is zero cannot be rejected for the choice to be a 
dominant consolidation member. 
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 of mayors. Residents' political participation could be one factor that checks the 
self-serving behavior of politicians, for example as motivated by adverse economic 
situations that may render municipal consolidation an urgent agenda in the region. 
 
  In this context, it is interesting to make an inquiry into the governors’ behavior. 
The Law to Promote Municipal Mergers requested that prefecture governments would 
take a leading role in promotion of the merger (Articles 59-64). In spite of this clause, 
governors were not uniformly motivated to meet the requirements. Some governors even 
publicly argued against the central government’s merger policy. Incorporating governor 
variables could lead to a greater understanding of the political economy of the 
municipality mergers in Japan. 
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 Appendix: Data Source 
 
MAYOR; 
Shichoson Jichi Kenkyukai (Municipal Autonomy Research Group), Zenkoku Shichoson 
Yoran: Heisei 14 (National Municipality Databook: Fiscal Year 2002), Tokyo, 2002  
POP, AREA, CURRENT; 
Chiho Zaimu Kyokai (Association of Local Finance), Shichoson-Betsu Kessan Joukyo 
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 Table 1. Number of Municipalities in Japan 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
(as of end)  March, 1999 March,  2003 March,  2006 
⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯⎯ 
Total   3,232   3,212     1,821 
 
  City     670     675      777 
  Town   1,994    1,976      846 






 Table 2. Summary Statistics (Total 3212: Town/Village 2537 and City 675) 
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
       Mean    Std. Dev.   Min     Max 
――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
MAYOR (month)   87.42       67.35            0        561 
 
   Town/Village    88.61       68.35            0        561 
   City      82.96       63.32            2        389 
 
POP (thousand)     36.93      125.65          0.20     3466.88 
 
   Town/Village    10.56         8.64          0.20       51.98 
   City     136.01      249.97         5.80     3466.88 
 
AREA (km
2)    115.60      136.34          1.34     1408.20 
 
   Town/Village   104.42     127.63          1.34     1408.20 
   City     157.62      158.18           5.10     1231.13 
 
CURRENT (%)    86.21        7.02         45.50      136.50 
 
   Town/Village    85.76        7.00         45.50      136.50 




 Table 3. Probit Estimates: Determinants to be a Subordinate Merger Partner 
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
    Town/Village (908 Subordinate)  Town/Village/City (925 Subordinate) 
  I   II   III   IV 
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
MAYOR   0.001     0.001   




3 *  -0.002/10
3 
  (1.77)   (1.70)   (1.69)   (1.38) 
 
POP   -0.061*** -0.061*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
  (6.58)   (6.60)   (8.16)   (8.15) 
POP-SQ   0.001***   0.001***   0.006/10
3 ***  0.006/10
3 *** 
  (2.92)   (2.95)   (7.41)   (7.40) 
AREA   -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (5.79)   (5.81)   (5.44)   (5.45) 
CURRENT  0.162***   0.161***   0.146***   0.145*** 
  (3.43)   (3.43)   (3.19)   (3.17) 
CURRENT-SQ  -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
  (3.23)   (3.23)   (2.94)   (2.93) 
CITY       -0.607*** -0.609*** 
      ( 4 . 1 1 )    ( 4 . 1 2 )  
 
Pseudo R
2  0.055   0.055   0.137   0.136 
Log Likelihood 
Ratio     183.15   181.77   527.51   526.00 
(p-value   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00) 
observations  2537   2537   3212   3212 
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
Note: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses.  






Table 4. Logistic Estimates: Determinants to be a Subordinate Merger Partner 
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
    Town/Village (908 Subordinate)  Town/Village/City (925 Subordinate) 
  I   II   III   IV 
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
MAYOR   0.002     0.002 






  (1.79)   (1.74)   (1.71)   (1.61) 
 
POP   -0.100*** -0.101*** -0.053*** -0.053*** 
  (6.39)   (6.39)   (9.23)   (9.24) 
POP-SQ   0.001***   0.001***   0.015/10
3 *** 0.015/10
3 *** 
  (2.69)   (2.69)   (7.69)   (7.69) 
AREA   -0.002*** 0.002***   -0.002*** -0.002*** 
  (5.58)   (5.60)   (5.58)   (5.60) 
CURRENT  0.298***   0.295***   0.278***   0.275*** 
  (3.09)   (3.07)   (2.98)   (2.97) 
CURRENT-SQ  -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** 
  (2.92)   (2.91)   (2.80)   (2.79) 
CITY       -0.871*** -0.870*** 
      ( 2 . 8 5 )    ( 2 . 8 5 )  
 
Pseudo R
2  0.055   0.055   0.145   0.144 
LR  chi2     182.71   181.07   558.56   557.01 
(p-value   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00) 
observations  2537   2537   3212   3212 
―――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
Note: Absolute values of z-statistics are in parentheses.  
***Statistically significant at the 1% level and * 10% level. 